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When the threat is stronger than the




We compare the effects of changes in trade costs on trade volumes and on the gains from trade
under Cournot and Bertrand competition. In both cases, the threshold trade costs below which
the possibility of trade affects the domestic firm’s behavior is the same; and welfare is U-shaped
under reasonable conditions. However, welfare is typically greater under Bertrand competition;
for higher trade costs the volume of trade is greater under Cournot competition, implying a “van-
der-Rohe Region”; and, for even higher trade costs, there exists a “Nimzowitsch Region”, where
welfare is higher under Bertrand competition even though no trade takes place.
1. Introduction
 The sign and magnitude of the gains from trade and from the easing of trade restrictions
continue to be among the central issues in international trade. This is all the more so now that
globalization is being challenged and trade costs are rising rather than falling in many markets.
Recent work has thrown new light on the quantitative extent of these gains under perfect com-
petition and monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms (see, for example, Arkolakis,
Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare, 2012; Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014; Melitz and Redding,
2015; Arkolakis et al., 2018). However, far less is known about the effects of trade cost reduc-
tions in oligopolistic markets, despite growing evidence that trade is dominated by large firms
(see, for example, Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008; Freund and Pierola, 2015).
In this article, we compare the effects of changes in trade costs under Cournot and Bertrand
oligopoly in a common framework. The main objective is to set out the comparative effects of
changes in trade costs on trade volumes and on the gains from trade under Cournot and Bertrand
oligopoly. Under the general heading of trade costs we include transport costs, transaction costs,
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and the cost of dealing with administrative and regulatory barriers to trade. Unlike tariffs these
trade costs do not generate government revenue.
Some results of oligopoly models in trade and industrial organization are sensitive to the
mode of competition. See, for example: Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) and Deneckere and
Davidson (1985) on merger incentives; Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), and Sklivas
(1987) on strategic delegation; and Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986)
on strategic trade policy.1 Notwithstanding this, we show that many of the predictions about the
effect of trade cost changes are qualitatively robust to whether firms compete in a Cournot or
Bertrand manner. At the same time, there are important quantitative differences between the two
models. This reflects the fact that firms compete more aggressively in the Bertrand than in the
Cournot case.
We focus on a trade interpretation throughout, where a home firm faces foreign competi-
tors that are penalized by a trade cost, and we want to understand the effects of changes in trade
restrictiveness. However, our model also throws light on other problems in industrial organiza-
tion. For example, the model can be reinterpreted as one with a technologically superior firm
facing competitors that suffer from a cost disadvantage, where the interest lies in the effects of
technological catch-up by the competing firms.
To focus attention on the nature of competition, and to allow us to derive explicit solutions
for the outcomes we highlight, we first consider a symmetric multi-country world with linear
demands and differentiated products. In this setting a single domestic firm faces competition in
both home and foreign markets from many foreign firms. In this context, we show that the qual-
itative effects of a reduction in trade costs are common irrespective of the mode of competition.
In particular, a fall in trade costs increases trade volume monotonically; welfare as a function of
trade costs follows a U-shaped pattern; and there is a critical level of trade costs below which the
possibility of trade affects the domestic firm’s behavior, which is the same under Cournot and
Bertrand competition.
On the other hand, there are important quantitative differences between the Cournot and
Bertrand cases. For any trade cost below this critical level, welfare is higher under Bertrand than
under Cournot competition. This makes intuitive sense, because Bertrand competition is more
competitive than Cournot competition. Much less intuitive are the rankings of trade volumes.
When trade costs are sufficiently low, we get the expected result where the volume of trade is
always higher under Bertrand competition. However, for higher trade costs, imports are lower
under Bertrand competition, though welfare remains higher. We call the region of parameter
space in which this outcome holds the “van-der-Rohe Region,” after the remark attributed to
the architect Mies van der Rohe, “Less is more.”2 More surprisingly still, for even higher trade
costs, no trade takes place under Bertrand competition while the volume of trade is positive
under Cournot. Nonetheless, the mere threat of trade under Bertrand competition is sufficient
to discipline the home firm and is more effective in reducing prices and raising welfare than
actual trade is under Cournot competition. We call the region of parameter space in which this
outcome holds the “Nimzowitsch Region,” after the remark attributed to the chess grandmaster
Aron Nimzowitsch, “The threat is stronger than the execution.”3 Our article thus contributes
to a literature that shows that the level of imports by itself is a poor measure of the extent to
which home firms are exposed to foreign competition.4 Earlier work that discusses the region of
parameter space in Bertrand competition in which a producing firm is disciplined by the presence
of a non-producing rival include Clarke and Collie (2003) in a trade context and Zanchettin
1 As Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) emphasize, the issue in these examples is whether firms’ actions are strategic
substitutes or complements rather than whether they engage in Cournot or Bertrand competition. As we shall see in
Section 4, most of our results do not hinge on whether actions are strategic substitutes or complements.
2 See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Mies_van_der_Rohe.
3 See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aron_Nimzowitsch.
4 Holmes, Hsu, and Lee (2014) arrive at a similar finding in a different model with head-to-head Bertrand compe-
tition. See also recent empirical work by Bao and Chen (2018).
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(2006).5 Our focus is on the welfare properties of the region and we explore how the size of
this region and the van-der-Rohe region are affected by the number of firms and the degree of
product differentiation.
As noted, we first show that all these results hold in a multi-country model with linear
demands. Subsequently, we allow for more general demand functions, and show that most of the
results are qualitatively robust.
We focus throughout on a comparison between one-stage Cournot and Bertrand games.
However, these can be interpreted as alternative outcomes to a two-stage game, as shown by
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) with identical products and by Maggi (1996) with differentiated
products (see also Neary and Tharakan, 2012). In these models, firms first invest in capacity
and then set their prices in a Bertrand manner. If the capacity cost is low enough, the outcome
resembles a one-stage Bertrand game but if it is high enough it resembles a Cournot game. Hence
our results can be interpreted as applying to a comparison between otherwise identical industries
that differ in the ease with which they can adjust their capacity.
Our results build on and extend a large literature on the welfare effects of trade costs and
trade liberalization under oligopoly. For overviews, see Leahy and Neary (2011) and Head and
Spencer (2017). The topic was first studied by Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983)
using a model of two-way trade in segmented markets. In this reciprocal-markets setting, they
demonstrated that, under Cournot competition, intra-industry trade can occur in equilibrium even
when goods are identical. Bernhofen (2001) introduced product differentiation into Cournot and
Bertrand oligopoly models of intra-industry trade, focusing on the effects of trade on profits and
consumer surplus. The effects of trade costs in related models have also been considered by
Anderson, Donsimoni, and Gabszewicz (1989), Brander and Spencer (2015) and Collie and Le
(2015). Clarke and Collie (2003), and Friberg and Gandslandt (2006, 2008) have explored gains
from trade under Bertrand competition.6
Our article is the first to compare the effects of trade costs on trade volumes and on the
gains from trade under Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly with general demands. Given reasonable
restrictions on demand we show lower trade costs in the neighborhood of the prohibitive trade
cost causes welfare to decline under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. We thus show that
welfare under Cournot with high trade costs can be lower than welfare under autarky. However,
under Bertrand competition there is a region of trade costs above the prohibitive trade cost where
welfare rises under Bertrand competition as trade costs fall even though no trade takes place.
With linear demands we go further and show that this implies that under Bertrand welfare never
falls below the autarky level regardless of the number of countries or the degree of product
differentiation. Thus with linear demands, for a range of trade costs, under Cournot but not under
Bertrand, trade can lead to lower welfare than autarky when firms incur trade costs. Our setting
also draws on an extensive literature in industrial organization. Our framework of a differentiated-
product oligopoly where we compare Cournot and Bertrand behavior is similar to that of Singh
and Vives (1984) and Vives (1985). However we have extended it to allow for asymmetric selling
costs and corner solutions. Unlike work on entry deterrence and accommodation that builds on
Dixit (1980) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), the effects that we identify arise in one-stage
games where firms simultaneously choose their outputs or prices.
The plan of the article is as follows. Section 2 introduces the setting of a many-country
reciprocal-markets model. Section 3 considers the linear multi-country version of the model and
illustrates the effects of trade costs on outputs, trade volumes, and welfare under Cournot and
Bertrand competition. Section 4 explores the case with general demands, and shows that the main
results are robust. Section 5 concludes, while the Appendices give proofs of the main results.
5 Zanchettin (2006) calls this region the limit pricing region in a closed economy model with asymmetric costs that
compares profits under Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly with linear demands.
6 While Clarke and Collie (2003) show that welfare under Bertrand duopoly with linear demands is above the
autarky level. Friberg and Gandslandt (2008) demonstrate that it is possible to have losses from trade in the Bertrand case
with many firms and close substitutes if the autarky equilibrium is competitive enough.
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2. The setting
 Throughout the article, we use a framework in which preferences and technology are in-
dependent of the mode of competition. There are n ≥ 2 countries in the world, in each of which
there is a single domestic firm producing a unique good and, except in autarky, competing against
imports from foreign firms. Markets are segmented, so each firm’s output may sell at different
prices in different countries in equilibrium. The results we will highlight do not hinge on exoge-
nous asymmetries between countries, so to avoid unnecessary notation we confine attention to
the case where all firms face symmetric demands, the same production cost functions, and the
same trade costs. This allows us to focus attention on a single representative country that we refer
to as “home,” and our main interest is to understand the endogenous asymmetries that arise as a
result of trade costs.
On the demand side we assume a home representative consumer with quasi-linear utility:
U = z0 + u(x, y) (1)
where x is home sales of the home firm and y is the import vector with the sales of a typical
foreign firm in the home market represented by yj. Here z0 is the consumption of the outside
good which we assume is produced under perfect competition. This is a composite commodity
defined over all the other goods in the economy, and we treat it as the numéraire good with a price
equal to one. The sub-utility function u(x, y) represents the domestic utility from consumption
of the oligopolistic goods.
We can write the identity between national expenditure and national income as follows:
z0 + px + p∗ · y = I +  (2)
Here p is the home-market price of the goods produced by the home firm; p∗ is the vector of
home-market prices of the foreign firms; I is domestic factor income; and  is the total profits
of the home firm in all markets. As it is written, equation (2) assumes that trade costs do not
yield any revenue. If instead they took the form of tariffs, then tariff revenue would appear as
an additional term on the right-hand side of (2). (We briefly return to the issue of tariff revenue
at the end of the next section.) We can make use of (2) in the utility function (1) to write home
welfare as:
W = U = χ +  + I (3)
where χ ≡ u(x, y) − px − p∗ · y is a micro-founded expression for home consumer surplus. As
is standard, we assume that the non-numéraire sector is small in factor markets and so we treat I
as constant.
On the cost side, we assume that marginal costs are constant and we ignore fixed costs.
Hence the home and foreign firms’ operating profits in the home market are:
π = (p − c)x (4)
and
π ∗j = (p∗j − c − t )yj (5)
where c is the marginal production cost of the home and foreign firms, assumed to be constant,
and t is the per-unit trade cost.
3. Linear demands and many countries
 Turning to the linear oligopoly case, we will first examine the effects of symmetric multilat-
eral changes in trade costs under Cournot competition and then compare them with the outcome
under Bertrand competition. We continue to assume that there is a single domestic firm in each
country and that all firms have the same marginal cost of production and face the same trade cost
C© The RAND Corporation 2021.
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of selling into the other markets. We first consider the case where all firms’ sales are positive
under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. We then turn to the case where imports are zero
in equilibrium yet the best response of the home firm is to charge a lower price than it would
in unconstrained autarky. We show that this occurs in the interval between the prohibitive trade
cost threshold under Bertrand, t̂B and the corresponding prohibitive trade cost threshold under
Cournot t̂C, which is always non-empty and increases in the number of countries. The final step
is to show that welfare is higher under Bertrand than under Cournot competition in this interval.
Hence as discussed in the introduction it is a Nimzowitsch region.
A priori, the effect of an increase in the number of firms could go either way. On the one
hand, more firms means that consumers enjoy more variety when imports occur. This tends to
increase welfare under Cournot competition relative to Bertrand competition. On the other hand,
more firms means more competition, including more incipient competition when imports do not
occur. This forces the home firm to charge a lower price under Bertrand competition, which is
clearly welfare-improving. It turns out that the competition effect dominates the variety effect,
and by more the greater the number of firms.
There are n countries in the world, in each of which there is a single domestic firm producing
a unique good. Due to symmetry across countries, we can focus our analysis on a representative
market. Thus we can restrict attention to the effect of a trade cost reduction on equilibrium in
the home market. Define total import volume by: Y = ∑n−1j=1 yj. The sub-utility function for the
oligopolistic goods from (1) takes the form:













The parameter b > 0 can be interpreted as an inverse measure of market size. As for e, it is an
inverse measure of the degree of product differentiation, which we assume henceforward lies
strictly between the cases of perfect substitutes (e = 1) and independent demands (e = 0)7. The
inverse demand faced by the domestic firm and a representative foreign firm can be written as:
p = a − b(x + eY ) and p∗j = a − b(yj + ex + eY− j ) (7)
where Y− j = Y − yj. Firm profits are given by (4) and (5) as before. Hence the firms’ first-order
conditions under Cournot competition are p − c + x ∂ p
∂x
= 0 and p∗j − c − t + yj
∂ p∗j
∂y j





= −b is the slope of the firms’ inverse demand functions. The corresponding
first-order conditions under Bertrand can be written as: p − c + x( ∂x
∂ p
)−1 = 0 for the home firm,
and p∗j − c − t + yj( ∂y j∂ p∗j )








the slope of the firms’ direct demand functions. It is convenient to rewrite the home and foreign
first-order conditions in a way that nests the Cournot and Bertrand special cases:
A − b(2 + V )x − b(n − 1)ey = 0 (8)
A − b(2 + V + (n − 2)e)y − bex − t = 0 (9)
where we have made use of the fact that the outputs of every foreign firm are identical, allowing
us to drop the subscript on y. The parameter A ≡ a − c is the difference between the maximum
price consumers are willing to pay and the marginal cost of production. In (8) and (9), we can
interpret V as a mode of competition or conduct parameter, though we are only interested in the
7 We rule out the case of e = 1 since it implies that no imports take place under price competition for any strictly
positive trade cost. We rule out the case of e = 0 since it implies that firms are independent monopolists with no strate-
gic interaction.
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values it takes in Cournot and Bertrand competition.8 The conduct parameters under Cournot
and Bertrand, respectively, are:
V C = 0 and V B = − (n − 1)e
2
1 + (n − 2)e (10)
By inspection, V B < V C for any e > 0 and V B > −1 for e < 1. We show in Appendix A that V B
is decreasing in n and in e.
The first-order conditions in (8) and (9) can be solved for the equilibrium quantities. Sales
by the home firm, and imports from a typical foreign firm are given by:
x = xF
(












xF = yF = A
b





A, and t ≤ t̂ (12)
Here xF and yF denote home sales and imports, respectively, in free trade;  can be interpreted
as a measure of the competitive pressure faced by an individual firm for a given value of V ;9 and
t̂ denotes the prohibitive trade cost, that is, the minimum trade cost at which imports become
zero. Note that, since V varies with the mode of competition from (10), so also do xF , yF , ,
and t̂; where necessary we use superscripts C and B, for example, xFC, t̂B, etc., to denote Cournot
and Bertrand competition, respectively. We are interested in comparing outputs and welfare under
Cournot and Bertrand competition for different values of the trade cost t. The response of outputs
to trade costs can be deduced immediately from (11):10
Lemma 1. Irrespective of the number of countries:
(a) In free trade, both home sales and imports are higher in Bertrand than in Cournot competi-
tion: xFB > xFC;
(b) Higher trade costs raise home sales and reduce imports irrespective of the form of competi-
tion: ∂x
∂t
> 0 and ∂y
∂t
< 0;
(c) A rise in trade costs raises home sales by more and lowers imports by more in Bertrand than













(d) The prohibitive trade cost is lower in Bertrand than in Cournot competition: t̂B < t̂C.
Turning to the response of welfare to trade costs, it is clear that consumer surplus falls
monotonically as trade costs rise. However, the response of profits is more complex. Focusing
on the home firm, its total profits equals the sum of profits on home sales and the profits from
exporting to n − 1 foreign markets. The first are given by (4) while the second equal the for-
eign firms’ profits in the home market because of the symmetry of the model, home exports∑n−1
j=1 x
∗
j = (n − 1)x∗ equal home imports
∑n−1
j=1 yj = (n − 1)y, so the home firm’s profits on its
exports are (p∗ − c − t )(n − 1)x∗ = (p∗ − c − t )(n − 1)y. Using the first-order conditions, max-
imized profits are equal to b(1 + V )x2 from home sales and (n − 1)b(1 + V )(x∗)2 from exports.
8 This can also be seen as a conjectural variations parameter. See, for example, Dixit (1986). Although conjectural
variations are now seen as an unsatisfactory way of modelling strategic interaction in general when interpreted as a
conduct parameter V provides a useful way of comparing Cournot and Bertrand behavior on a common basis.
9 This interpretation follows as in Mrázová (2011), because, for a given value of V ,  is increasing in the number
of firms n and in the degree of substitutability e: increases in either of these make the environment each firm faces more
competitive and so tend to reduce individual firm output. For more details see Appendix A.
10 These results and many subsequent ones are stated as strict, which follows from our assumption that e lies strictly
between zero and one.
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Total profits for the home firm are then equal to the sum of these, and their behavior as trade
costs change can be shown to equal:
∂
∂t













(ex − (2 + V )x∗)
{
< 0 when t = 0 (so x = x∗)
> 0 when t = t̂ (so x∗ = 0)
(13)
where pF − c = b(1 + V )xF is the firms’ price-cost margin in free trade. Profits are decreasing in
trade costs at free trade, but increasing in them in the neighborhood of the prohibitive trade cost
t̂. Hence, it follows that profits must be a U-shaped function of trade costs, irrespective of the
mode of competition.11 The same must be true of welfare. At free trade, both consumer surplus
and profits are falling in trade costs. As for autarky, the fall in consumer surplus is not enough
to offset the rise in home profits for an infinitesimal increase in trade costs: dχ = −xd p (since
y = 0 at autarky) and d = (p − c)dx + xd p (since y = x∗ = 0 and p∗ = c + t). The sum of
these reduces to dW = (p − c)dx and we know from part (b) of Lemma 1 that home sales are
increasing in trade costs. Hence it follows that welfare is also increasing in trade costs in the
neighborhood of autarky. Summarizing:
Lemma 2. Assume 0 < e < 1. Then welfare is a U-shaped function of trade costs under both
Cournot and Bertrand competition.
This lemma is a multi-country oligopoly generalization of the U-shaped welfare results of
Brander and Krugman (1983) for Cournot competition and Clarke and Collie (2003) for Bertrand
competition. Having established how welfare depends on trade costs, we next want to compare
the levels of welfare in Cournot and Bertrand competition.
Consider first the range of trade costs consistent with positive imports under both types of
competition, which, from part (d) of Lemma 1, is 0 ≤ t ≤ t̂B. We want to show that, in this range,
welfare is always higher under Bertrand than under Cournot competition for given values of e,
n and t. Welfare equals the utility level given by (6), evaluated in equilibrium where all foreign
firms have equal sales, minus production and trade costs:











where Y = (n − 1)y because of symmetry. We can differentiate this with respect to V as a simple













where Q denotes total sales in the home market: Q = x + Y . It is easy to check that sales of the
home firm, and total sales in the home market, are both decreasing in V ; hence they are higher
in Bertrand than in Cournot competition. (Details are in Appendix A.) Similarly, it is immediate
that, in the relevant range, welfare increases in both x and Y : intuitively, increases in either of
these partially overcome the oligopoly distortion. As for the effect of an equal and opposite
change in x and Y , this has a negative effect on welfare by reducing variety, but also a positive
effect through a saving in trade costs. It turns out that the latter effect dominates so Wx > WY .12
Combining these results, we see that welfare is decreasing in V . This gives our first key result:






12 From equation (A6) in Appendix A, the difference Wx − WY equals the dumping margin, the difference between
the price charged at home, p, and the f.o.b. price received from exporting, p∗ − t.
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Proposition 1. For trade costs in the range 0 ≤ t ≤ t̂B,welfare is strictly higher in Bertrand com-
petition than in Cournot competition: W B > W C, for e > 0.
Surprisingly, the unambiguous ranking of welfare levels under different modes of com-
petition does not carry over to the levels of imports in the range 0 ≤ t ≤ t̂B. From part (a) of
Lemma 1, we know that imports in free trade are higher under Bertrand competition than under
Cournot competition, while from part (d) imports at the upper point of the range t̂B are lower
under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Since imports are linear in t from
(11), there must be an intermediate trade cost tR, 0 ≤ tR ≤ t̂B, at which imports are the same





t=tR = 0 (16)
Hence imports must be lower under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition for
all t such that tR < t < t̂B. Substituting for outputs from (11), we can express tR in terms of free-




yFBt̂C − yFCt̂B t̂
B (17)
By inspection, this is less than t̂B. It can be shown that tR is decreasing in both n and e: see
Appendix A. Combining these results with Proposition 1, we can conclude:
Proposition 2. The non-empty interval (tR, t̂B) is a van-der-Rohe Region in which welfare is
strictly higher but imports are strictly lower under Bertrand competition than under Cournot
competition: W B > W C and 0 < yB < yC, for 0 < e < 1. The lower boundary of this interval, tR,
is decreasing in the number of firms n and the degree of substitutability e.
Finally, we want to consider what happens for trade costs in the interval (̂tB, t̂C ). Consider
first the size of the interval. Since V = 0 under Cournot, t̂C = 2−e
2
A is independent of the number
of countries. As for t̂B, it is increasing in V B which is decreasing in n as we have seen, and so
overall it is falling in n. It follows that as the number of countries increases the interval between
the two prohibitive trade costs gets larger. It can also be shown that this interval is increasing in
the degree of substitutability e: see Appendix A.
The final part of the proof is to show that welfare is higher under Bertrand competition in the
interval (̂tB, t̂C ); in other words, that this interval is indeed a Nimzowitsch Region. We show this
in three steps, the details of which are given in Appendix A. Let W N represent W B in the interval
(̂tB, t̂C ). First, we show that W N − W C is quadratic and concave in t everywhere. This implies that
a sufficient condition for W N − W C to be positive throughout the region is that it is non-negative
at the end-points of the region. Next, we can show that W N is equal to W C at the upper end
of the region, t = t̂C, where no trade occurs and the home firm is an unconstrained monopolist
in both Bertrand and Cournot competition. Finally, we can show that W N is equal to W B at the
lower end, where t = t̂B, since welfare depends only on outputs, and at that point outputs under
unconstrained Bertrand competition, xB and yB, are equal to those under constrained Bertrand
competition, xN and yN (with yN = yB = 0). Since we know from Proposition 2 that W B is greater
than W C at that point, it follows that W N is also greater than W C.
Hence, it follows that welfare is always greater under Bertrand than under Cournot com-
petition throughout the (̂tB, t̂C ) region, so it is indeed a Nimzowitsch Region. Summarizing our
results:
Proposition 3. The non-empty interval (̂tB, t̂C ) is a Nimzowitsch Region in which welfare is
higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition: W N > W C; while imports
C© The RAND Corporation 2021.
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FIGURE 1
REGIONS OF TRADE AND WELFARE IN DUOPOLY
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Notes: The three loci show the values of t̂C , t̂B and tR (in decreasing order as functions of e)
B: Bertrand yields higher Trade and Welfare, yB > yC > 0, W B > W C
vdR: van-der-Rohe Region, yC > yB > 0, W B > W C
N: Nimzowitsch Region, yC > yB = 0, W B > W C
M: Unconstrained Monopoly, yC = yB = 0
are positive under Cournot competition and zero under Bertrand competition. The width of this
region is increasing in the number of firms n and the degree of substitutability e.
Figure 1 shows how the sizes of the different regions vary with the degree of substitutability
e and the trade cost t (normalized by A) for the canonical case of duopoly. Figure 2 illustrates
Propositions 1, 2, and 3. The three panels repeat the loci from Figure 1 for values of n equal
to 4, 12 and 24, respectively. They show clearly that, as the number of countries increases, the
Nimzowitsch Region expands slowly, whereas the B region contracts substantially. As n grows
without bound, the lower boundary of the Nimzowitsch Region asymptotes to 2 1−e
2−e , while the
lower boundary of the van-der-Rohe Region expands to such an extent that the B region is fully
crowded out. (See Appendix A.) For very large numbers of firms, there are almost no parameter
values for which Bertrand competition yields higher imports, yet it always yields higher welfare.
C© The RAND Corporation 2021.
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FIGURE 2
REGIONS OF TRADE AND WELFARE IN OLIGOPOLY FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF n
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Notes: See figure 1 for legend.
Since welfare is U-shaped under Cournot for t < t̂C from Lemma 2 we know that welfare
falls below the autarky level for some levels of the trade cost. Is that also true under Bertrand
competition? Under Bertrand competition welfare is U-shaped in the interval [0, t̂B]. However,
welfare at t̂B is above that in unthreatened autarky. Despite this apparent ambiguity it turns out
that we are able to obtain the following clear result:
Proposition 4. Under Cournot competition but not under Bertrand competition the minimum
welfare level with trade is below the welfare level under autarky.
This proposition is a generalization of the results of Brander and Krugman (1983) and
Clarke and Collie (2003) to the case of a multi-country oligopoly. Losses from trade in this
linear model arise from the presence of wasteful trade costs. (Total trade costs tY (t ) follow an
inverted U-shape in the per-unit trade cost.) However, this source of losses from trade is not
present when tariff revenue is costlessly returned to consumers. When no tariff revenue is lost,
trade liberalization in the form of tariff reductions, never leads to welfare with trade falling below
that in autarky regardless of the mode of competition13.
4. General demands
 We now consider welfare under general demands and discuss the extent to which the re-
sults obtained in the previous section are dependent on the assumption of linear demands. We
will show that many of the results are qualitatively robust. Figure 3 highlights the properties that
we will show are robust when we switch from linear to general demands. We begin with some
preliminary discussion of the properties of general demands and their implications for firm be-
havior. Following this, we consider the effects of changes in trade costs on outputs and welfare in
free trade and in autarky. We then show that the novel insights from earlier continue to hold: both
a van-der-Rohe Region and a Nimzowitsch Region always exist. To avoid unnecessary notation,
we restrict attention to the canonical case of duopoly.
 Properties of general demands. We write inverse demands as p(x, y) for the home good
and p∗(y, x) for the foreign. We impose some mild regularity assumptions on these demands.
13 In the presence of tariff revenue, unlike when it is absent, it can be shown that welfare under Cournot and
Bertrand are both monotonically decreasing and globally concave in t below the prohibitive level.
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FIGURE 3
WELFARE AND TRADE COSTS WITH GENERAL DEMANDS
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Notes: The numbers in parentheses correspond to the numbered results given later in the text.
First, we assume that the demand functions are twice differentiable and strictly downward-
sloping: px < 0 and p∗y < 0. Next, we assume that the goods are substitutes: py < 0 and p
∗
x < 0.
Finally, we assume that demand for the imported good has a choke price: limy→0 p∗(y, x) < ∞.
This assumption guarantees the existence of a prohibitive trade cost that eliminates all imports,
which in turn is a necessary condition for the existence of a Nimzowitsch Region, as we show
below. The assumption is consistent with linear demands as in the previous section, and also
with many of the other demand functions used in applied economics. It rules out the case where
consumers have an infinite reservation price for the first unit purchased, as for example with
iso-elastic or logistic demand. Thus we rule out Dixit–Stiglitz preferences which do not yield a
choke price or a prohibitive trade cost.14
We also assume that the demand functions are symmetric, in the sense that their levels and
first and second derivatives are equal when evaluated at the same point:
p(x0, y0) = p∗(y1, x1)
pi(x0, y0) = p∗j (y1, x1), i, j = x, y, i 	= j
pxi(x0, y0) = p∗y j(y1, x1), i, j = x, y, i 	= j
⎫⎬⎭ when: x0 = y1 and y0 = x1 (18)
Finally, we assume that the inverse demand system can be inverted to get the direct demands:
x = x(p, p∗) and y = y(p∗, p) (19)
For this inversion to be possible, we require that own-price effects in demand dominate cross-
price effects, in the sense that ee∗ < 1, where e(x, y) ≡ py/px and e∗(x, y) ≡ p∗x/p∗y are inverse
measures of product differentiation for the home and foreign demand functions, respectively.15
Our assumption that goods are substitutes ensures that both e and e∗ are strictly positive.
14 Requiring that demand must have a choke price for the Nimzowitsch Region to exist is in line with Vives (1985),
following Friedman (1977).
15 Inverting the inverse demand functions to yield well-behaved direct demand functions requires that px p∗y −
p∗x py > 0, which from the definitions of e and e
∗ implies that (1 − ee∗ )px p∗y > 0.
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 Firm behavior in interior equilibria. In this section, we consider the responses of im-
ports and domestic sales when both firms sell positive amounts in either Cournot or Bertrand
competition. The home firm’s profit function can be written as a function of either quantities
or prices: π (x, y) = [p(x, y) − c]x or π (p, p∗) = (p − c)x(p, p∗). We assume that both functions
are quasi-concave in the firm’s own action, and have a unique maximum given the foreign firm’s
action. We also assume that all equilibria are stable, which requires that own effects dominate
cross effects at the margin:
Assumption 1.  ≡ πxxπ ∗yy − πxyπ ∗yx > 0 and ̃ ≡ πppπ ∗p∗ p∗ − πpp∗π ∗p∗ p > 0.
This in turn implies:
Lemma 3. πxx + πxy = 2px + py + x(pxx + pxy) < 0 when outputs are equal (x = y); and πpp +
πpp∗ = 2xp + xp∗ + (p − c)(xpp + xpp∗ ) < 0 when prices are equal (p = p∗).
The proof is immediate. In quantity competition when outputs are equal,  equals (πxx)2 −
(πxy)2 = (πxx + πxy)(πxx − πxy) > 0. There are two cases to consider. Either outputs are strategic
substitutes, πxy < 0, in which case πxx + πxy < 0 follows immediately, which implies that πxx −
πxy must also be negative. Alternatively, outputs are strategic complements, πxy > 0, in which
case πxx − πxy < 0, which implies that πxx + πxy must also be negative.16 This lemma implies that
own effects dominate cross effects at the margin in a different sense: home marginal revenue
falls following an equal increase in the outputs of both goods, and the marginal responsiveness
of home profits to own price falls following an equal increase in the prices of both goods. Finally,
for some (though not all) of the results that follow, we need an additional mild restriction on the
home firm’s profits as a function of outputs:
Assumption 2. πxx = 2px + xpxx < 0 holds everywhere.
Assumption 2 is stronger than requiring the second-order condition to hold: it is equiva-
lent to the home firm’s marginal revenue being always downward-sloping. This means that the
demand function can be convex, but not too much so.
Turning to the production side, we continue to assume identical constant marginal produc-
tion costs c and per-unit trade costs t. Hence, under monopoly, the home firm has first-order
condition:
πx = p(xM , 0) + xM px(xM , 0) − c = 0 (20)
where xM is the monopoly output, and p(xM , 0) = pM is the monopoly price.
Under Cournot competition, the home and foreign firm’s first-order conditions are:
πx = p(x, y) + xpx(x, y) − c = 0 and π ∗y = p∗(y, x) + yp∗y(y, x) − c − t = 0 (21)












recalling that  is positive from Assumption 1. Hence an increase in the trade cost always re-
duces the volume of imports, while it raises domestic sales if and only if the goods are strategic
substitutes (πxy = py + xpxy < 0).
Under Bertrand competition, the firms’ first-order conditions are:
πp = (p − c)xp(p, p∗) + x = 0 and π ∗p∗ = (p∗ − c − t )yp∗ (p∗, p) + y = 0 (23)
16 An analogous proof holds in Bertrand competition.
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For later use, it is very helpful to rewrite these in terms of inverse rather than direct de-
mands and their derivatives; this will facilitate comparison with the corresponding Cournot first-
order conditions in (21). To do this, we can use footnote 15 to write xp = p
∗
y









1−ee∗ . Substituting into (23) allows us to write the two firms’ first-order
conditions under Bertrand competition expressed in terms of inverse demands:17
p(x, y) + xpx(1 − ee∗) − c = 0 and p∗(y, x) + yp∗y(1 − ee∗) − c − t = 0 (24)
Returning to (23), differentiating shows that the effects of trade costs on prices are: d pB/dt =
−(yp∗/̃)πpp∗ , which is positive if and only if prices are strategic complements; and d p∗B/dt =
(yp∗/̃)πpp which is always positive. (Again, recall that ̃ must be positive from Assumption 1.)


















The natural case is where these effects are positive and negative, respectively: higher trade costs
raise home output and restrict imports. Unlike the Cournot case in (22), the latter outcome is
not guaranteed. However, it must hold if own effects on demand and marginal profits dominate
cross effects (|yp∗ | > |yp| and |πpp| > |πpp∗ |). Henceforward we assume that dyBdt is negative, so
that trade costs reduce imports. The former outcome, dx
B
dt
> 0, is not guaranteed by dominant
own effects. A sufficient condition for it to hold is that prices are not too strongly strategic com-
plements.
Armed with these preliminary results, we can now turn to consider their implications for the
robustness of the results derived in the previous section for linear demands.
 Zero trade costs. At t = 0 the sales of the home and foreign firm are equal. Thus under
Cournot, xC = yC, and under Bertrand, xB = yB, where C and B denote the Cournot and Bertrand
equilibria, respectively. We can write the first-order condition for the home and foreign firms
under Cournot at t = 0 as πx(qC ) = π ∗y (qC ) = 0, where q = x = y is the symmetric output which
is at the level qC in the zero trade cost Cournot equilibrium. From (24), the first-order condition
under Bertrand can be written as πx(qB) + β(qB) = 0, where qB represents the symmetric output
at the zero trade cost Bertrand equilibrium, and where β(q) = −xpxee∗ = −yp∗yee∗ is positive
at any q > 0. Since β(q) is positive everywhere we have: πx(qB) < 0 but πx(qC ) = 0 and since
πx(q) falls in q from Lemma 3 it follows that: qB > qC. Therefore, at zero trade costs, the volume
of trade is higher under Bertrand than Cournot competition. It must also be the case that prices
at free trade are lower under Bertrand than Cournot. Finally, it is easy to show that welfare is
monotonically increasing in output in a symmetric free-trade equilibrium.18 Hence at zero trade
costs welfare is higher in Bertrand than in Cournot competition. Summarizing:19
Lemma 4. At free trade, Bertrand competition leads to lower prices, higher trade volume, and
higher welfare than Cournot competition.
Next, we want to compare the responsiveness of welfare to trade costs at free trade under
the two forms of competition. We first derive a general expression for the change in welfare.
Recall from expression (3) above that welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and home profits.
17 The same outcome would be obtained if we assumed that the firms have “Bertrand conjectural variations”: for
example, the home firm conjectures that, if it increases its output, the foreign firm’s output will change so as to exactly
offset the home firm’s impact on the foreign price. Recall the discussion in footnote 8.
18 Evaluating welfare from equation (3) in symmetric free trade gives: W |t=0 = u(x, x) − 2cx + I . Differentiating
gives dW
dx
|t=0 = 2(ux − c) = 2(p − c). This is strictly positive given that there is an oligopoly distortion.
19 The results on prices and trade volume are implicit in Vives (1985).
C© The RAND Corporation 2021.
484 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
The change in consumer surplus is: dχ = −(xd p + yd p∗) and the change in the profits of the
home firm is: d = (p − c)dx + xd p + (p∗ − c − t )dx∗ + x∗d p∗ − x∗dt. Combining these and
making use of the symmetry of the model which implies that home exports x∗ equal home imports
y, we can write the change in welfare as:
dW = dχ + d = (p − c)dx + (p∗ − c − t )dy − ydt (26)
Thus consumption of home and imported goods have a positive effect on welfare, while wasteful
trade costs have an additional negative effect.
Consider next the welfare effect of an increase in trade costs starting at free trade (t = 0).













− y, h = C, B (27)
It can be shown that total domestic consumption x + y is unambiguously decreasing in trade
costs at free trade under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Detailed derivations are given












which confirms the result found in the linear case. Summarizing:
Lemma 5. Starting at free trade, an increase in trade costs lowers welfare under both Cournot
and Bertrand competition.
 Prohibitive trade costs. Next we turn to the case of prohibitive trade costs. We first
show that they must be lower under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. We can write
the Cournot equilibrium output pair as a function of the trade cost as {xC(t ), yC(t )}. The equi-
librium level of imports in the Cournot case reaches zero at the threshold prohibitive trade
cost, t̂C. Let x̂C = xC (̂tC ) and ŷC = yC (̂tC ) = 0 be the Cournot equilibrium outputs at t̂C. At
the prohibitive trade cost the Cournot first-order conditions given in (21) can be written as
p(̂xC, 0) + x̂C px (̂xC, 0) − c = 0 and p∗(0, x̂C ) − c − t̂C = 0 for the home and foreign firm, re-
spectively. At the prohibitive trade cost the home first-order condition takes exactly the same
form as under monopoly, so, from (20), we have x̂C = xM . Making use of this allows us to write:
t̂C = p∗(0, xM ) − c. This means that, if the trade cost were at t = t̂C and the home firm were to
behave as an unconstrained monopolist, the foreign firm’s trade-cost-inclusive price-cost margin
would be zero and the foreign firm would be unable to export profitably.
Consider next the case of Bertrand competition. Let t̂B be the threshold prohibitive trade cost
under Bertrand. Write the Bertrand equilibrium outputs at t̂B as: x̂B = xB (̂tB) and ŷB = yB (̂tB) =
0. At t̂B, the first-order conditions under Bertrand given in (24) can be written as p(̂xB, 0) +
x̂B px (̂xB, 0) − c + β (̂xB, 0) = 0 for the home firm, where β = −xpxee∗, and as p∗(0, x̂B) − c −
t̂B = 0 for the foreign firm. Since β > 0 it follows that: p(̂xB, 0) + x̂B px (̂xB, 0) − c < 0. Making
use of this and Assumption 2 we get: x̂B > x̂C = xM . It then follows that t̂B = p∗(0, x̂B) − c <
p∗(0, x̂C ) − c = t̂C. Summarizing:20
Lemma 6. The prohibitive trade cost is lower under Bertrand than under Cournot competition:
t̂B < t̂C.
20 Both threshold trade costs are unique: t̂C from (22), and t̂B from (25) given our assumption that dyB/dt is al-
ways negative.
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Next, consider the effect of a small fall in trade costs on welfare starting at the prohibitive





= (p − c)dx
h
dt
, h = C, B (29)
The effect of trade costs on outputs in interior equilibria have been derived above: see equations



















Inspecting these expressions and recalling equations (22) and (25), we can conclude that:
Lemma 7. Starting at the relevant prohibitive trade cost, a reduction in trade costs lowers welfare
under Cournot competition if and only if outputs are strategic substitutes; and it lowers welfare
under Bertrand competition provided prices are not too strongly strategic complements.
These results are indicated by the points denoted [3] and [4] in Figure 3.
 The van-der-Rohe region. Next we want to show that there exists a van-der-Rohe Region,
that is, a subset of trade costs at which welfare is higher but imports are lower in Bertrand than
in Cournot competition.
The first step is to show that there must exist at least one trade cost at which imports are
equal under the two modes of competition. We know from Lemma 4 that at free trade imports
are higher under Bertrand competition, and we know from Lemma 6 that at the prohibitive trade
cost t̂B they are zero under Bertrand competition and strictly positive under Cournot competition.
Hence, since imports are always continuous in trade costs, we can conclude that:
Lemma 8. There exists at least one trade cost, tR ∈ (0, t̂B), at which the volume of imports is the
same in both Cournot and Bertrand competition.
Start with the case where there is a unique trade cost, tR, at which the volume of imports is
the same. Hence, it must be true that an infinitesimal increase in the trade cost must yield higher
imports under Cournot than under Bertrand competition. To see this, let yR denote the level of
imports under both forms of competition when the trade cost equals tR. We can then show that
home sales must be higher under Bertrand competition. Consider the response of home profits to
a small increase in home sales when imports equal yR:
πx(x, y
R) = p(x, yR) + xpx(x, yR) − c (31)
In Cournot competition, we know from the first-order condition (21), evaluated at the equilibrium
level of home sales which we call xCR, that the expression in (31) is zero: πx(xCR, yR) = 0. By
contrast, in Bertrand competition, we know from the first-order condition (24) that it must be
strictly negative:
πx(x
BR, yR) = p(xBR, yR) + xBR px(xBR, yR) − c = xBR px(xBR, yR)ee∗ < 0 (32)
where xBR denotes the level of home sales in the Bertrand equilibrium. Recalling from Assump-
tion 2 that the home firm’s marginal profit is always decreasing in home sales, this implies that
home sales are strictly higher under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. Since imports are
the same, this in turn implies that welfare is strictly higher. It follows that a small increase in t
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will lead to higher imports but lower welfare under Cournot than under Bertrand competition.21
Hence there exists a van-der-Rohe Region in the right-hand-side neighborhood of tR.
Next, consider the possibility that there are many trade costs at which imports are the same
under both forms of competition. Assume that such trade costs arise from multiple but separated
intersection points of the two functions giving imports as a function of trade costs. (We rule out
the theoretical curiosum of a continuum of intersections.) It then follows that the number of such
intersections cannot be even, and that in the neighborhood of each odd intersection the argument
just given for the case of a unique tR continues to apply. Hence we can conclude:
Proposition 5. There must exist a (not necessarily connected) van-der-Rohe Region; that is, a
subset of trade costs at which imports are lower but welfare is higher under Bertrand than under
Cournot competition.
 The Nimzowitsch region. The final step is to prove the existence of a Nimzowitsch region.
With general demands, this requires two distinct conditions. First, “threat” and “execution” must
coexist: there must exist a range of trade costs such that, under Bertrand competition, imports
are zero and the equilibrium price is below the autarky level, while, under Cournot competition,
imports are strictly positive. We call this “import contestability.” By itself it corresponds to a
weak version of a Nimzowitsch region, since welfare is higher under Bertrand competition than
in autarky, even though no imports take place. However, for the strong version of a Nimzowitsch
region we require in addition a second condition: the threat must be “superior” to the execution,
meaning that welfare must be higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competi-
tion. With general demands we cannot expect to prove that this holds throughout the region in
which import contestability holds, but we can prove it holds for a small fall in trade costs in the
neighborhood of autarky. We call this “local superiority of Bertrand competition.” We consider
these two conditions in turn.
Formally we can define import contestability as follows:
Definition 1. Import Contestability: Imports are strictly positive under Cournot competition,
yC > 0, and zero under Bertrand competition, yB = 0, with pB < pM .
We wish to show that import contestability holds if and only if trade costs are in the interval
(̂tB, t̂C ). (Recall that both thresholds are unique and, from Lemma 6, that the interval between
them is non-empty: t̂B < t̂C.) To show this, we consider in turn trade costs outside and inside
this range.
First, it is immediate that import contestability cannot hold for trade costs outside the in-
terval. For trade costs lower than t̂B, imports under Bertrand competition are strictly positive:
yB > 0 for t ∈ [0, t̂B). While for trade costs equal to or higher than t̂C, imports under Cournot
competition are zero: yC = 0 for t ≥ t̂C. In both cases, one or other of the conditions for import
contestability is violated.
Second, we turn to explore what happens in the interval (̂tB, t̂C ). It is immediate that imports
are strictly positive under Cournot competition, yC > 0, in this range, since we have seen in




< 0 for t ∈ [0, t̂C]. It remains to prove that, under Bertrand competition, the other two
conditions for import contestability hold in this range: the equilibrium level of imports is zero,
yB = 0, and the equilibrium price is lower than that of an unconstrained monopolist, pB < pM . To
do this, we must consider the properties of the Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand game.
21 We ignore the contrived case where (32) holds, so welfare is strictly higher in Bertrand than in Cournot com-
petition at tR, W CR < W BR, but only infinitesimally so, and, for an infinitesimal increase in the trade cost above tR, the
welfare levels in Cournot and Bertrand competition are equal.
C© The RAND Corporation 2021.
LEAHY AND NEARY / 487
FIGURE 4
IMPORT CONTESTABILITY IN THE BERTRAND GAME [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Consider first the foreign best-response function. This is illustrated in Figure 4(a). In an in-
terior Bertrand equilibrium (where imports are strictly positive), the foreign firm’s best-response
function is: p∗ = B∗(p; t ) = argmaxp∗ π ∗(p∗, p ; t ). However, if the home firm’s price falls to a
level where the zero-import constraint binds, then the foreign firm’s best response is to charge a
price equal to its marginal cost of serving the market, c + t.22 Hence the foreign best-response
function is simply p∗ = c + t, in anticipation of zero sales, and B∗(p, t ) when the home price is
high enough that the foreign firm anticipates positive sales; with the threshold between the two
given by the locus p̃∗(p) defined implicitly by y(p, p̃∗) = 0. Combining these two regimes, the
foreign firm’s best-response function is:
p∗ = B̃∗(p, t ) =
{
c + t when p̃∗(p) ≤ B∗(p; t )
B∗(p; t ) when p̃∗(p) ≥ B∗(p; t ) (33)
This locus intersects the zero-import locus, and is shown by the bold locus in Figure 4(a)
In the same way, we can examine the best responses of the home firm. First, for low import
prices, the home firm’s best response is also to charge a low price along its unconstrained best-
response function B(p∗) = argmaxpπ (p, p∗). Consider next the home firm’s best-response func-
tion when t∈ (̂tB, t̂C ). We wish to show that the home firm’s best response is to set its own price at
a level p̃ such that the zero-import constraint, y( p̃, p∗) = 0, just binds. We can write the domestic
price at which the zero-import constraint just binds as p̃(p∗) for t ∈ (̂tB, t̂C ). First, note that p̃(p∗)
is monotonically increasing (since goods are substitutes, so yp is positive). Next, note that p̃(p∗)
equals the monopoly price at the upper bound of the range, p̃(p∗) = pM when p∗ = c + t̂C. This
reflects the fact that the prohibitive trade cost in Cournot competition, t̂C, equals the threshold
level of trade costs at or above which the home firm can act as an unconstrained monopolist un-
der Bertrand competition. It follows from this and from the monotonicity of p̃ in p∗ that p̃(c + t )
must be less than pM for t < t̂C.
Next, to show that p̃(p∗) is the best-response function for t ∈ (̂tB, t̂C ), consider price de-
viations by the home firm. This can be illustrated with the help of 4(b). First, consider price
reductions from p̃(p∗). Such reductions in the home firm’s price while keeping imports at zero
would lower the home firm’s profits, since p̃(p∗) ≤ pM , profits are maximized at pM , and profits
are quasi-concave in p. Next, consider an upward deviation in the price from p̃(p∗). The home
firm’s interior Bertrand best-response function can only intersect once with p̃(p∗). This follows
from the assumption that yp∗πpp − ypπpp∗ > 0 (see equation (25) and the subsequent discussion).
The slope d p/d p∗ of the home firm’s interior Bertrand best-response function, B(p∗), is less
22 Following most of the literature, we rule out cases where firms, in anticipation of zero sales, set price below
marginal cost. For an alternative view and references see Erlei (2002).
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than the slope d p/d p∗ of the zero-import locus, p̃(p∗), at the point where they intersect, where
p∗ = c + t̂B.23 This means that p̃(p∗) cannot be on the upward-sloping part of π (p, p∗). That is,
πp( p̃(c + t ), c + t ) ≤ 0 for t≥ t̂B. Thus an increase in the home firm’s price from p̃(p∗) would
lead to imports (y > 0) and result in the home firm’s profits falling. Hence p̃(p∗) is the best-
response function for t ∈ (̂tB, t̂C ). The home firm’s best-response function is:
p = B̃(p∗) =
⎧⎨⎩
B(p∗) when p̃(p∗) ≤ B(p∗)
p̃(p∗) when B(p∗) ≤ p̃(p∗) ≤ pM
pM when pM ≤ p̃(p∗)
(34)
This function is shown by the bold locus in Figure 4(b).
Finally, we can bring together the responses of the two firms to show the full equilibrium, as
in Figure 4(c). Import contestability holds for t ∈ (̂tB, t̂C ): imports are zero, yB = 0, the foreign
firm sets the price p∗B = c + t, and the home firm prices below the monopoly level, pB < pM .
Summarizing:
Lemma 9. Import contestability, yC > 0, yB = 0, and pB < pM , holds throughout the interval
t ∈ (̂tB, t̂C ).
Consider next the second property, local superiority of Bertrand competition:
Definition 2. Local Superiority of Bertrand Competition: W C < W B in the neighborhood of











To show that this holds, consider first the case of Bertrand competition. In this case we can show
that welfare is decreasing in trade costs throughout the relevant region and not just at t = t̂C. This
is because, as we have seen, imports are zero, and the foreign firm sets its price equal to c + t.
Because imports are zero, the change in welfare for a small reduction in trade costs depends only











And, because of the firm’s pricing behavior, a fall in trade costs results in an increase in home
output sufficient to keep imports equal to zero:
















Consider next the case of Cournot competition. Note first that, in the neighborhood of autarky,
a small change in imports is valued at p∗ − c − t which is zero. Hence, in quantity competition,
23 The slope d p/d p∗ of the interior Bertrand best-response function is −πpp∗/πpp, while the slope of the zero-import
locus p̃(p∗ ) is −yp∗/yp. It is then easy to show that the condition yp∗πpp − ypπpp∗ > 0 implies that −yp∗/yp > −πpp∗/πpp:
the zero-imports locus is steeper than the interior home best-response function.
24 This property holds throughout the interval (t̂B, t̂C ), but at the end-points it holds only for changes in t that move
strictly inside the interval; that is, dW
B
dt
|t=t̂B ,+ and dW Bdt |t=t̂C ,−.
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the change in welfare for a small reduction in trade costs starting in autarky depends only on the











From (22), this is positive provided outputs are strategic substitutes; that is, a small reduction
in trade costs starting at t = t̂C increases trade but reduces welfare. Since we have already seen
in (38) that it increases welfare under Bertrand competition, this confirms that a Nimzowitsch
Region exists when quantities are strategic substitutes.
We can go further and show that, even when quantities are strategic complements, so that
welfare under Cournot competition rises for a small reduction in trade costs starting in autarky
(i.e., the W C locus is downward-sloping at t = t̂C unlike in Figure 3), welfare is still higher locally
under Bertrand competition, so equation (35) holds. Intuitively, even if dxC/dt is negative, it is
still the case that dxB/dt is larger in absolute value in the neighborhood of t̂C. See Appendix B
for the proof. Hence we can conclude:
Proposition 6. A Nimzowitsch Region always exists in the neighborhood of autarky.
Taken in conjunction with the results in (28), (30) and (38), this confirms that the qualita-
tive features of welfare as a function of trade costs are the same with general demands as in the
linear case. However, with general demands unlike with linear demands we cannot be sure that
the Nimzowitsch region exists away from the neighborhood of autarky. Furthermore, unlike in
the linear case, we cannot be certain that under Bertrand competition, welfare with trade is never
lower than welfare under autarky. There is, however a special case in which we can be more
definitive about both of these issues. So far, we have assumed that goods are differentiated, how-
ever it is interesting to consider the case of identical goods. With identical goods, under Bertrand
competition, there are no imports for t > 0. In other words t̂B = 0. In that case, under Bertrand
competition below t̂C, the marginal cost of the foreign firm is c + t and the marginal cost of the
home firm is c so the home firm will set a price just below c + t when t > 0. (Here we assume
as is standard, that the firms share the market when they set the same price). It is then immediate
that, when goods are identical, we can never have losses from trade under Bertrand competition
and also that a Nimzowitsch region exists for all trade costs in the interval (0, t̂C ).25
5. Conclusion
 In this article, we have compared changes in trade costs under Cournot and Bertrand com-
petition in a common reciprocal-markets framework. We have shown that the qualitative effects
of trade cost reductions are broadly similar in the two cases. In particular, welfare is typically U-
shaped in trade costs, first falling (as home firms face more competition) and then rising (as prices
fall and consumers gain). Moreover, the critical level of trade costs below which the possibility
of trade affects the domestic firm’s behavior is the same under both Cournot and Bertrand com-
petition.
Nonetheless, there are important quantitative differences between the effects of trade cost
changes in the two cases. These broadly reflect the fact that Bertrand competition is generally
more competitive than Cournot competition. While this is known from previous work, we have
identified three novel and important aspects of the comparison. First is that the pro-competitive
effects of trade are stronger under Bertrand competition despite the fact that, for sufficiently
high trade costs, the volume of trade is greater under Cournot competition. We call the region of
parameter space in which this outcome obtains a “van-der-Rohe Region” since “less is more”:
25 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this case.
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though imports are lower, welfare is higher under Bertrand competition. Second is that a potential
rival can affect an incumbent’s sales and profits under Bertrand competition even if no imports
take place in equilibrium. Moreover, this has a sufficiently large effect on domestic prices and
hence on consumer surplus that it leads to higher welfare. We call the region of parameter space
in which this outcome obtains a “Nimzowitsch Region” since “the threat is stronger than the
execution”: even though imports are zero under Bertrand competition, the pro-competitive effect
is sufficiently strong that welfare is higher than under Cournot competition. Third is that while
under Cournot competition, trade can lead to lower welfare than autarky for some levels of trade
costs we have shown that under Bertrand competition, for the case of linear demands, welfare
with trade never falls below the autarky level regardless of the trade cost, number of countries or
the degree of product differentiation.
As mentioned in the introduction, our model can be given a closed economy, technological
catchup reinterpretation, as one with a technologically superior firm facing competitors that suf-
fer from a cost disadvantage. Interpreted in this way there is a parameter range in which partial
catchup reduces welfare. It can also be shown, with linear demands, that welfare for some levels
of partial catchup under Cournot competition will fall below the monopoly level but that in the
Bertrand case welfare is never lower than under monopoly.
Our analysis clearly has implications for empirical work. For one thing, it shows that the
level of imports by itself is a poor measure of the extent to which home firms are exposed to
foreign competition. Moreover, a change in foreign access costs may affect the behavior of a
domestic firm even though imports themselves do not change much or may not even occur. This
chimes with recent empirical work by Bao and Chen (2018), who use media reports of potential
multinational investments to quantify threats to domestic firms from foreign competition, and
show that incumbent firms change their behavior even when foreign entry does not occur. Similar
considerations apply in closed-economy applications of our model: a high market share by itself
need not imply that an incumbent firm is shielded from competition; it may be disciplined by
potential competition from a higher-cost competitor, even though the latter’s sales are low or
non-existent. Further work is needed to devise empirical measures of these kinds of invisible
competition and to quantify their practical relevance.
Appendix A
Proofs of Propositions 1-4 follow.
 Comparative statics of V and . Recallingthe definition of V B ≡ − (n−1)e2





(1 + (n − 2)e)2 < 0 and
∂V B
∂e
= −(n − 1)e 2 + (n − 2)e
(1 + (n − 2)e)2 < 0 (A1)
Hence, as a function of n, V B falls monotonically from its value of −e2 in duopoly, n = 2, to its limiting value of −e as
n grows without bound. As a function of e, it falls monotonically from zero to −1 along the e ∈ [0, 1] interval.
Next we want to see how the competitiveness parameter  responds to changes. The only ambiguity arises in the
case of Bertrand competition, when B = 2 + V B + (n − 1)e. Differentiating with respect to n and using (A1) yields:
dB
dn





1 − e(1 − e)
(1 + (n − 2)e)2
)
> 0 (A2)
So the indirect effect of n on the mode of conduct parameter, V B dampens but does not offset the direct effect of n in
raising . Similarly, differentiating with respect to e:
dB
de
= n − 1 + ∂V
B
∂e
= (n − 1) 1 + 2(n − 3)e + (n − 2)(n − 3)e
2
(1 + (n − 2)e)2 (A3)
For n ≥ 3 this is definitely positive. The only ambiguity arises at n = 2, when (A3) simplifies to 1 − 2e. Hence the
indirect effect of e on V B dampens the direct effect of e in raising B; but does not offset it except in the duopoly case
when goods are close substitutes (n = 2 and e > 0.5).
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 Proof of Proposition 1: welfare levels in the [0,̂tB] Interval. In order to prove that W B is greater than W C in the
[0, t̂B] interval, we wish to evaluate the response of welfare to a change in the mode of conduct parameter V from (15).




1 + (n − 1)e











These are decreasing in V by inspection. Next, we determine the responsiveness of welfare to changes in x and Y :
Wx = A − bx − beY = p − c WY = A − bex − b 1
n − 1 (1 + (n − 2)e)Y − t = p
∗ − c − t (A5)
As for the difference between them, this simplifies to:
Wx − WY = t − b(1 − e)(x − y) = 1 + V
2 + V − e t (A6)
Both Wx − WY and WY are strictly positive in the interior of the interval (0, t̂B ). As for the end-points, WY is strictly positive
at t = 0 and Wx − WY is strictly positive at t = t̂B. Substituting into (15) proves Proposition 1.
 Proposition 2: The lower boundary of the vdR region. We wish to show that the lower boundary of the van-der-
Rohe Region, denoted by tR, is decreasing in both n and e. Recall the expression for tR in (17). Using (12) to eliminate
terms, this can be rewritten as follows:
tR = A
(
2 − e + V B)(2 − e)
eC + 2(2 − e + V B ) (A7)
where, from (10) and (12), V B = − (n−1)e2
1+(n−2)e and 
C = 2 + (n − 1)e. Recalling from the discussion following equation
(A1) above, that V B must lie in the range [−e2, −e], it follows that 2 − e + V B is positive.


















To confirm the signs of the individual terms, it is clear by inspection that tR is decreasing in C , which itself is increasing
in n; hence the first expression on the right-hand-side is negative. As for the second expression, differentiating yields:
∂tR
∂V B
= A e(2 − e)
C
(eC + 2(2 − e + V B ))2 > 0 (A9)
and we have seen in equation (A1) that V B is decreasing in n. This confirms the signs of the last two terms in (A8), which
completes the proof that tR is decreasing in n.
We can also establish the limiting values of the tR locus as n varies. In the duopoly case, where n = 2, (A7) reduces
to a downward-sloping 45-degree line: tR = A(1 − e), as illustrated in Figure 1. As for the other extreme, as n → ∞,




2(1 − e)(2 − e)




This confirms that the van-der-Rohe Region expands to fully crowd out the B region for large n.






















The signs of the first four terms are straightforward as before, recalling from equation (A1) that V B is decreasing in e. As
for the final term, inspecting (A7) it can be seen that the numerator is decreasing in e and the denominator is increasing
in e (since C > 2). It follows that tR is decreasing in e.
 Proposition 3: Welfare levels in the (̂tB,̂tC ) interval. We want to show that, in the (̂tB, t̂C ) interval when n ≥ 2,
welfare is higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition.
The first step is to write the level of welfare in general form:
W = u(x, y) − c(x + Y ) − tY (A12)
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Using (6) to eliminate utility, and imposing symmetry across all countries, so y = Y
n−1 , gives:










+ e(x + Y )2
)
− tY (A13)
To evaluate this in a Cournot equilibrium, we use the expression for imports by firm from (11), specialized to the Cournot




A + (n − 1)e
2 − e t
)




2 − e t
)
(A14)
Substituting into (A13) yields
W C = (3 + (n − 1)e)(nA − 2(n − 1)t )
2b(C )2
A + (n − 1) 12 + 4(n − 2)e − (n − 1)e
2
2b(2 − e)2(C )2 t
2 (A15)
By inspection, this is decreasing at free trade, and is always convex in t.
However, under Bertrand in the interval (̂tB, t̂C ), the zero-import constraint binds, then the foreign firms’ best
response is to charge a price equal to their marginal cost of serving the market, c + t. The zero-import constraint with
symmetry among the foreign firms is Y (p∗, p) = 0. Where:
Y (p∗, p) = (n − 1)
1 − e
(1 − e)a − (p∗ − ep)
b(1 + (n − 1)e) (A16)
is aggregate imports. From (A16), the symmetric maximum foreign price consistent with zero imports as a function of
the home price is:
p∗ = p̃∗(p) = (1 − e)a + ep (A17)
In interval the (̂tB, t̂C ), the home firm’s best-response is to set its own price at the level such that the zero-import constraint
just binds: from its perspective it operates on the inverse of (A17), which we denote by p = p̃(p∗ ) = p∗−(1−e)a
e
.
As for the level of welfare under Bertrand competition, W B, from (A13), with Y = 0, this equals W B = Ax − 1
2
bx2.
Output in turn is obtained by combining p̃(p∗ ) = p∗−(1−e)a
e
with p∗ = c + t and substituting into p = a − bx to obtain:
x|Y =0 = A−tbe . By inspection, we see that W B is concave in t. It follows immediately that W B − W C must be positive
throughout the relevant interval (̂tB, t̂C ). First, since W B is concave in t in this interval, and, as already shown, W C is
convex in t, the difference W B − W C must itself be concave in t. Next, note that this difference is strictly positive at the
lower end-point, t = t̂B, from Proposition 1, and that it is zero at the upper end-point, t = t̂C , where the home firm is an
unconstrained monopolist. It follows that W B is equal to or greater than W C throughout the interval, which confirms that
it is indeed a Nimzowitsch Region as stated in Proposition 3.
 Proposition 3: The width of the [̂tB,̂tC] interval. Direct calculation from (12) shows that the width of the [̂tB, t̂C]
interval is:
t̂C − t̂B = − eV
B
2(2 + V B ) ≥ 0 (A18)
This is decreasing in V B, which in conjunction with (A1) gives the result in Proposition 3 that the region is increasing in
n. To show how it varies with e, totally differentiate:
d (̂tC − t̂B )
de
= ∂ (̂t
C − t̂B )
∂e
+ ∂ (̂t





The first term on the right-hand side is positive from (A18); the final two terms are both negative from (A18) and (A1),
respectively. This proves the result in Proposition 3 that the region is increasing in e.
 Proposition 4: Gains from trade. We first define τ ≡ t
t̂
as the trade cost as a proportion of the prohibitive level.
We can express welfare for given V as a function of τ . When (11) and (12) are combined with (14) it is clear that welfare
W (τ ) is a convex quadratic in τ for τ ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter combination A2
b
is common to each term in W (τ ) and this
allows us to write W (τ ) = (ατ 2 − βτ + θ ) A2
b
, where α, β and θ are all positive. These are:
β = (n − 1)̂t 1
2
(3 + 2V + (n − 1)e) (A20)







(3 + 2V + (n − 1)e) (A21)
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+ β − θ (A22)
Welfare at autarky is obtained by substituting monopoly output, xM = A
2b










. At given τ this expression has the same sign as:
(τ ) = ατ 2 − βτ + γ (A23)
where γ = θ − 3
8
. This reaches a minimum at τmin = β
2α
with a minimum value:









which takes the sign of the term in brackets. First note that this term is negative under Cournot as we can use the fact that
at τ = 1 we are at uncontested autarky so C (1) = 0 = αC − βC + γ C . Then using βC = αC + γ C in (4αCγ C − (βC )2 )
we get −(αC − γ C )2 < 0. This confirms that losses from trade occur at some trade costs under Cournot. The Bertrand
case is much less immediate because B(1) > 0 due to the Nimzowitsch region.
The algebra is simplified when we rewrite the term in brackets in (A24) under Bertrand, 4α
Bγ B
(βB )2




− 1 and φγ ≡ 1 − 2 γ BβB . Then B(τmin ) ≥ 0 when




(n − 1)(2 + V B − e)
(
B
(3 + 2V B )






(n − 1)(2 + V B − e)
(
B
3(2 + V B )
4(3 + 2V B + (n − 1)e) − 1
)
(A27)
The use of (A26) and (A27) in (A25) and simplification using (10) allows us to write the condition for gains
from trade at all trade costs under Bertrand when 0 < e < 1 as: (4 + 3V B )(2 + V B − e) − (1 + V B )K ≥ 0 where
K = 2−e−9e(1−e)+ne(2−3e)
3+(n−4)e . Since 4 + 3V B > 0 and (2 + V B − e) − (1 + V B ) = 1 − e > 0, gains from trade are guaranteed
if: (
4 + 3V B)− K = 2
(3 + (n − 4)e)(1 + (n − 2)e)
(
5 − 13e + n2e2 − 8ne2 + 6ne + 3e3 + 6e2) > 0 (A28)
Clearly 2
(3+(n−4)e)(1+(n−2)e) is positive so it remains to check the sign of the expression N (e, n) ≡ (5 − 13e + n2e2 − 8ne2 +
6ne + 3e3 + 6e2 ). At n = 2 this reduces to N (e, 2) = 5 − e − 3(2 − e)e2 which is positive for 0 < e < 1. Furthermore,
N (e, n) is increasing in n and so is always positive. Thus there can be no losses from trade under Bertrand competition.
Appendix B
Derivations of results 1-4 in section 4 and proof of proposition 6 follow.
 Interior equilibria. We begin with the case of Cournot competition. Substituting from the expressions for output
change in (22) and (25) into the general expression for welfare change in (26) yields an expression that cannot be signed
in general. However, we can sign it unambiguously in special cases. First, in free trade, when t = 0, what matters for the













− y = p − c
πxx + πxy − y < 0 (B1)
So, an increase in trade costs at t = 0 reduces welfare. This gives result [1] in equation (28) in the text.
Second, we can sign the effect of trade costs on welfare at the prohibitive trade cost t̂C . At this point, we have





= (p − c) dx
C
dt
= − p − c

πxy (B2)
26 Recall from Lemma 3 that the denominator πxx + πxy is negative in a symmetric equilibrium.
C© The RAND Corporation 2021.
494 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
This gives result [3] in equation (30) in the text. We can conclude that, under Cournot competition, a small fall in the
trade cost from the prohibitive level, t̂C , reduces welfare if and only if outputs are strategic substitutes.


















yp∗ − y < 0. (B3)
This gives result [2] in equation (28) in the text. Hence a small increase in trade costs starting at zero reduces welfare. At





= (p − c) dx
B
dt






which is positive if xp∗πpp − xpπpp∗ is negative, the same condition we found above for home sales to be increasing in the
trade cost, dxB/dt > 0. Note that this is the left-hand derivative at t = t̂B. This gives result [4] in equation (30) in the text.
 The Nimzowitsch region: proof of Proposition 6. We have shown in the text that, in Cournot competition, welfare
falls as trade costs fall in the neighborhood of autarky if and only if goods are strategic substitutes, dW
C
dt
|t=̂tC > 0. This
proves that a Nimzowitsch Region exists in this case. Can we go further and prove that it must also exist under strategic




0 and so dW
C
dt
|t=̂tC < 0. However, we can show that the same ranking between the changes in Cournot and Bertrand
competition holds as in the case of strategic substitutes. To see this, recall that the foreign firm’s first-order condition is




















































































which proves the result that, as trade costs fall in the neighborhood of autarky (t = t̂C), welfare rises faster under Bertrand
competition than under Cournot competition, when goods are strategic complements.
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